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This article argues against participation by the United States in the International Criminal
Court. The article attempts to show that participation in the ICC regime would be inconsistent with
American democracy, inimical to American national interests and would violate the Constitution.
Were the United States to become a State party to the Rome Statute, it would, for the first time
since July 4, 1776, acknowledge the superior authority of an institution neither elected by the
American people, nor accountable to them for its actions. Not surprisingly, ratification of the
Rome Statute also would violate the Constitution
THE CASE AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Lee A. Casey*
"I would know by what power I am called hither. I would
know by what authority, I mean lawful. There are many un-
lawful authorities in the world, thieves and robbers by the
highway."
King Charles I, Jan. 20, 1648/49
"Oh, confound all this... I'm not a scholar .... and frankly I
don't know whether the marriage was lawful or not. But
damn it, Thomas, look at those names .. .You know those
men! Can't you do what I did, and come with me, for fellow-
ship?"
The Duke of Norfolk
Act Two, A Man for All Seasons
INTRODUCTION
As one of his final acts in office, President Bill Clinton
signed the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court1 ("ICC"). He took this action knowing that the Senate
would not consent to U.S. ratification of that instrument, and
that many Senators-including many from his own party-had
expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of involving the
United States in this institution. Indeed, during Senate hearings
on the ICC in 1998, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) noted that
"major changes" were necessary, and suggested that the Senate
was wasting its time even discussing the matter: "I would hope
my Republican friends would focus on about twelve treaties that
require urgent attention up or down for us and we not spend a
lot more time on something [the Rome Statute] that I predict to
* Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, D.C. J.D. (1982) University of
Michigan; B.A. (1979) Oakland University. Mr. Casey has served in the Office of Legal
Policy (1986-1990) and the Office of Legal Counsel (1991-1993), U.S. Department of
Justice, and has practiced before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in The Hague.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9*
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
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you is not going to come to fruition anyway."2 The President
himself signed the Rome Statute acknowledging the instru-
ment's "significant flaws," and recommending that President
George W. Bush not submit the treaty for the Senate's considera-
tion "until our fundamental concerns are satisfied."'
Although President Clinton's judgment in signing a treaty
he knew the Senate would not approve can be questioned, his
conclusion that the Rome Statute is deeply flawed cannot. The
United States should not ratify the Rome Statute. Participation
in the ICC regime would be inconsistent with American democ-
racy, inimical to American national interests and would violate
the Constitution. Indeed, U.S. ratification of this instrument
would mark a profound, and unjustified, departure from the
central tenet of American government-that the ultimate right
to judge the wisdom and legality of the policies pursued, and
actions taken, by the officials and officers of the United States
rests in the sovereign American people.
Were the United States to become a State party to the Rome
Statute, it would, for the first time since July 4, 1776, acknowl-
edge the superior authority of an institution neither elected by
the American people, nor accountable to them for its actions.
That institution would then be in a position to interpose itself
into the policymaking processes of the United States through
the threat of criminal prosecutions against American leaders, of-
ficials, officers, and soldiers, to and including ordinary American
citizens. After ratification of the Rome Statute, no American
President could again order the use of military force without first
considering whether he, or his subordinates, might later be in-
vestigated and prosecuted by individuals with no allegiance to
the United States, and very possibly hostile to its interests.
Not surprisingly, ratification of the Rome Statute also would
violate the Constitution. Becoming a State party would vest the
ICC with jurisdiction over Americans both at home and abroad.
If, in the ICC's unreviewable opinion, offenses within its jurisdic-
tion occurred in the United States, it could prosecute and pun-
2. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on International Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 21,
2d Sess. (1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden, Member, Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations).
3. Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court on Decem-
ber 31, 2000, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1 (Jan. 8, 2001).
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ish Americans who have never strayed from home, and whose
actions affected only other American citizens. Such offenses,
however, are within the judicial power of the United States,
which cannot be exercised by any court or institution not recog-
nized by the Constitution itself, or established by Congress pur-
suant to authority granted in that document. This was the Su-
preme Court's ruling in the landmark, post-Civil War case of Ex
parte Milligan,4 and this remains the law. today.
The limited exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized
to this rule-permitting the military trial of "unlawful" combat-
ants during time of war-cannot and do not justify or support
U.S. participation in the ICC regime.5 That court would make
no distinction between civilians, lawful combatants, and unlawful
combatants, and would offer all a series of limited due process
guarantees that do not approximate, let alone vindicate, the re-
quirements of the Bill of Rights. In this regard, and among
other things, the ICC would not guarantee the right to a speedy
and public trial by jury, the right to confront all hostile witnesses,
or protections against "double jeopardy," as these rights are
known in the United States. Thus, even if the ICC could meet
the Constitution's structural requirements, including a prosecu-
tor and jUdges appointed by the President, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, the United States could not par-
ticipate in its operations and activities.
Indeed, these procedural issues highlight a flaw in the ICC
project not merely from the point of view of the United States,
but from the perspective of the international system at large.
However good the intentions of the ICC's proponents, that pro-
ject is grounded in a tragically misguided conceit. It assumes
that there are universally recognized and accepted notions of
law, justice, and procedural fairness. In fact, there are a number
of competing (and often openly hostile) views on each of these
points, and this is especially true in the procedural context.
Even the most closely related of the world's legal systems, the
Common Law and the Civil Law, begin from fundamentally dif-
ferent assumptions about the role of a criminal trial in the pur-
suit of justice. This is to say nothing of non-Western systems,
such as the Sharia. The Rome Statute, like the United Nations'
4. 71 U.S. 2.(1866).
5. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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ad hoc tribunals, has attempted to create an "international" pro-
cedural standard by drawing elements from both the Civil Law
and Common Law traditions. The result is a jerry-rigged system,
internally inconsistent, that lacks the legitimizing force of the
approval and acceptance that these separate systems have earned
over centuries.
I. RATIFICATION OF THE ROME TREATY WOULD BE
INCONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
The ICC will be an unprecedented and, indeed, revolution-
ary institution. Its power will be different in character and kind
from that of other international organizations, such as the
United Nations ("U.N.") and the World Trade Organization
("WTO") that the United States has joined. Unlike the U.N. or
WTO, the ICC would have the legal authority to act directly
upon individual American citizens, rather than merely to inter-
act with the government of the United States as an independent
sovereign, affecting individuals, if at all, only through national
•enforcement mechanisms.6 In fact, the legal right to investigate,
prosecute, and punish individuals is the kind of authority exer-
cised by sovereign States over their citizens and, arguably, it is
the most important such power. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
"[h]e who punishes the criminal is ... the real master of soci-
ety."7
The practical effect of vesting this power in, an institution
that can investigate and prosecute government officials, regard-
less of their official status, would be to transfer the ultimate au-
thority to judge the policies adopted and implemented by the
6. As noted by Antonio Cassese:
Since international law regulates the conduct, not of individuals but of
States, it is not a self-sufficient system. States have no soul, no capacity to form
and express an autonomous will; they are 'abstract' structures acting through
individuals. Human beings alone 'can give flesh' and blood to State activity.
Consequently, if they are to be translated into reality, .thus becoming effective
standards of behavior, international rules must be applied by natural persons.
Human beings, however, are still subject to national legal systems, which de-
cide of their own accord upon the procedures for choosing or selecting State
officials, and establish their field of competence and powers autonomously.
International law must bow to municipal authority in this area.
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 14 (1986).
7. See I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282-83 (Reeve trans. 1948
ed.), quoted in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 n.13 (1957).
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elected officials of the United States-the core attribute of sover-
eignty and the sine qua non of democratic self-government-away
from the American people and to the ICC's prosecutor and judi-
cial bench. This would violate the first principle of American
democracy-that the American people have an inherent right to
choose, directly or indirectly, the men and women who will exer-
cise power over them, and to hold those individuals accountable
for the exercise of that power. As James Madison noted in The
Federalist: "The genius of Republican liberty seems to demand
on one side not only that all power should be derived from the
people, but that those [e]ntrusted with it should be kept in de-
pendence on the people ... .,"' The ICC would neither derive its
power from the people nor would it be dependent upon them.
In fact, the ICC would exercise governmental power without
the sanction of popular election, or democratic accountability,
of any kind. Its prosecutor and judges would be selected by the
ICC's Assembly of States Parties, a body composed of one repre-
sentative from each country that has ratified the Rome Statute,
and designed to represent the interests of States, not individuals.
That body would, in no way, be representative of the people of
the United States or their interests. If the United States ratified
the Rome Statute, it would have but a single vote in the Assem-
bly-the exact same representation enjoyed by His Serene High-
ness, the Prince of Liechtenstein, the Grand Duke of Luxem-
bourg, the Republic of San Marino, Andorra, Antigua & Bar-
buda, and the Pacific atoll of Nauru.9 Such arrangements,
whereby the American people would be subjected to the author-
ity of a super-national institution, in which they had no control-
ling voice, were rejected even before the Revolution-at that
time, in the shape of suggestions that the Thirteen Colonies
might elect individuals to "represent" them in the British Parlia-
ment. ° Similarly, when the United States joined the United Na-
tions in 1945, only the creation of an absolute "veto" for it in the
Security Council, where all of the U.N.'s "coercive" power was
vested, was deemed sufficient to protect American interests.
If anything, the "international community" has become far
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9. Nauru's population numbers some 10,000 souls.
10. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 177 (1969).
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more diverse than it was in 1945. It does not, in any form, con-
stitute a unified polity, sharing the same political culture, values,
expectations, and sense of justice. Such shared values and aspi-
rations are, however, critical to the legitimacy of any governing
institution, especially a judicial one like the ICC. The founders
of the American Republic understood the importance of this
shared political culture, and incorporated into the Constitution
a requirement that each of the several states be guaranteed a
"republican form of government."1 As Madison explained:
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and com-
posed of republican members, the superintending govern-
ment ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system
against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more in-
timate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater inter-
est have the members in the political institutions of each
other .. 2
The fact that many Western democracies have ratified the Rome
Statute, and have loudly called upon the United States to follow
them for the sake of "fellowship," changes nothing. The Rome
Statute is open to all States, regardless of their form of govern-
ment, and a number of profoundly un-democratic countries
have already signed on. This includes Algeria, Cambodia, Haiti,
Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. All of these States have
been implicated in torture, or extra-judicial killings, or both. 3
Nevertheless, each of these States will have an equal voice in the
ICC regime once they have ratified the Rome Statute.
Given these facts, the claims made by ICC supporters that
the ICC will embody "American values," or that democratic ac-
countability will be preserved through U.S. representation in As-
sembly of States Parties, are nothing short of fantastic. The obvi-
ous lack of any requirement that the States parties subscribe-
and practice-fundamental democratic norms compels the con-
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Who can predict what effect a despotism established in Massachusetts would
have upon the liberties of New-Hampshire or Rhode-Island, of Connecticut or New
York?").
13. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999, 106th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2000), available at http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/human1999.html. Indeed, since
the ICC's jurisdiction is prospective only, Saddam Hussein could, in complete safety,
sign and ratify the treaty on Iraq's behalf. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11.
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clusion that the Assembly could not even claim to "virtually" re-
present the peoples over whom the ICC would exercise power.
For such "virtual" representation to exist, there must be a com-
mon "interest" among all those represented. Edmund Burke ex-
plained the point With regard to the British Parliament (which,
he believed, virtually represented the whole country, and not
just the parliamentary electors), as follows:
Parliament was not "a congress of ambassadors from different
and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as
an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates;
but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one
interest, that of the whole, where, not local purposes, not lo-
cal prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting
from the general reason of the whole."' 4
The ICC Assembly-of States Parties would be precisely and ex-
actly that "congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
interests" Burke spoke of, and could claim no democratic legiti-
macy even on a theory of virtual representation.
The 'judicial" character of the ICC in no way compensates
for the court's lack of democratic accountability. Although the
United States has an "independent" judiciary, in that the courts
are co-equal with, rather than subordinated to, the other
branches of government, both prosecutors and judges are ac-
countable for their substantive acts. On the state level, for exam-
ple, prosecutors are often directly elected by the local communi-
ties they serve, and can be disciplined through normal electoral
processes. On the federal level, U.S. attorneys, who oversee fed-
eral prosecutions, are appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Similarly, many states
elect judges directly for a specific term of office. Federal judges
serve at good behavior, but, like U.S. attorneys, are appointed by
the President, with the Senate's advice and consent. Judicial ap-
pointments, and prosecutorial policies, regularly figure as major
issues in national political campaigns.
Moreover, any rule of law adopted by a court in the United
States, and inconsistent with the views of the electorate, can be
changed through democratic processes, including legislation,
or, if necessary, constitutional amendment. The results in indi-
14. See Edmund Burke, Speech to his Bristol Constituents, 1774, quoted in WooD,
supra note 10, at 175.
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vidual cases also are subject to review and change, either
through legislation, the President's pardon power, or through
the elaborate appeals processes available on both the state and
federal levels. These appeals are to distinct courts, differing in
their jurisdiction, authority, and personnel, sometimes repre-
senting different sovereignties (state and federal) when issues of
national significance are involved. All appeals in the ICC will be
heard by an "appeals division," which will have institutional in-
terests identical to those of the other ICC organs."m
There is, in fact, no provision in the Rome Statute permit-
ting review or reversal of the ICC's decisions by an independent
body, and it is unclear whether even the unrepresentative Assem-
bly of States Parties would be able to affect the substantive poli-
cies pursued by the court in any meaningful sense. Although the
ICC's prosecutor and judges could be removed for "serious mis-
conduct," or a "serious breach" of duty, by a majority (two-thirds
in the case of a judge) of the States Parties,16 personal pecula-
tion or misconduct is not the issue. Unlike the national judicial
system in the United States, and in other modern democracies,
the ICC simply will not be part of an integrated governing struc-
ture, supported by institutions that enjoy democratic legitimacy,
and subject to institutional "checks and balances."
In fact, the only real limitation on the ICC's power will be its
own conscience. Ironically, from the viewpoint of many ICC
supporters, this is entirely appropriate. For example, the former
Prosecutor of the International, Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), Canadian Justice Louise Arbour, has
argued that "there is more to fear from an impotent than from
an overreaching Prosecutor ... an institution should not be con-
structed on the assumption that it will be run by incompetent
people, acting in bad faith from improper purposes."17 This, of
course, is precisely the assumption upon which American de-
15. This lack of any real "separation of powers" is one of the most important flaws
in the ICC framework. The ICC's partition into judicial bench, prosecutor's office, and
registrar, represents merely a bureaucratic division of authority-unlike the' separate
branches of the United States government, each with different powers, interests, and
constituencies. The ICC'sjudges and prosecutors will have the same institutional inter-
ests. Their performance will be assessed by the very same standards. Thus, the fact that
prosecutions may only go forward upon the approval of a judge provides little solace.
16. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 46.
17. See Justice Louise Arbour, Statement to the Preparatory Committee on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court (Dec. 8, 1997).
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mocracy is grounded. If there is, in fact, one particular Ameri-
can contribution to the art of statecraft, it is the principle-in-
corporated into the Constitution's very architecture-that the
security of our rights cannot be trusted to the integrity of our
leaders. By its nature, power is capable of abuse and people are,
by nature, flawed. As Madison wrote in support of strong separa-
tion of powers:
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government.
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflec-
tions on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.8
The ICC would not be obliged to control itself.
II. RATIFICATION OF THE ROME TREATY WOULD BE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES
Participation in such an uncontrolled, and uncontrollable,
institution would not be in the national interests of the United
States. Once vested with the power to review and judge Ameri-
can foreign and defense policies, there is no doubt that the ICC
will use this authority. Suggestions-often voiced in the period
leading up to the Rome Conference in 1998-that the ICC
would not target American officials may safely be dismissed as
fanciful. Indeed, this pleasant myth was exploded in 1999, by
none other than Justice Arbour, who launched a politically in-
spired investigation of President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair,
and other NATO officials, on account of the Alliance's campaign
over Kosovo. Largely based upon the civilian casualties resulting
from that campaign, China, Russia, and a group of international
human rights activists and lawyers-including a number of the
ICC's most vocal proponents-demanded action against the
NATO leadership, and Prosecutor Arbour accommodated. She
opened an investigation, modestly described as a "review," which
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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resulted in a Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (released June 13, 2000). No in-
dictments were brought. However, this was not because the
Prosecutor concluded that no offenses had been committed.
Rather, she did not go forward because, "[i] n all cases, either the
law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result
in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges
against high level accused or against lower accused for particu-
larly heinous offenses. '" 9 A court that is less dependent upon
the United States and NATO to support its authority is likely to
be far less circumspect.
And, the power vested in the ICC would provide plenty of
scope for mischief. The offenses listed in the Rome Treaty are
all defined broadly, and could be applied on an even wider basis
by the court in practice. This is particularly true with respect to
the allegation that is most likely to be brought against U.S.
forces-causing "disproportionate" civilian casualties and prop-
erty damage. Under Article 8 of the Rome Treaty, officials may
be prosecuted for
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civil-
ians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment which would
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated.2"
This provision, which attempts to embody traditional rules re-
quiring the avoidance of "disproportionate" civilian casualties,
can be interpreted to fit virtually any situation in which civilians
are killed or injured, or in which property damage results. What
is, and is not "clearly excessive," is very much a matter of opin-
ion, and opinions on this point can be expected to differ. As
Justice Arbour's Report explained, with admirable candor, in
discussing "the relative values to be assigned to the military ad-
vantage gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the
19. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. PR/
P.I.S./510-E (2000), para. 90, (releasedJune 13, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.
20. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (b) (iv).
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damage to civilian objects," whether such offenses have been
committed is based on a very subjective assessment:
[t]he answers to these questions [regarding allegedly exces-
sive civilian casualties] are not simple. It may be necessary to
resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may
differ depending on the background and values of the deci-
sion-maker. It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an
experienced combat commander would assign the same rela-
tive values to military advantage and to injury to noncomba-
tants. Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with
different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of
combat experience or national military histories would always
agree in close cases. 21
Permitting individuals with no stake in the American polity,
who owe no allegiance to the United States, and who may, in
fact, owe their allegiance to its most determined adversaries, to
make such determinations with respect to American officials or
forces would be folly. The application of this standard would
put the ICC prosecutor and judges in the position of reviewing
and judging any American military action which resulted in civil-
ian casualties, and determining for themselves whether it wasjus-
tified-without consideration of the operation's importance to
U.S. national interests, and accountability to the American peo-
ple. While ratification of the Rome Treaty would make a "multi-
lateral" foreign policy (such as the Kosovo operation) difficult
for the United States, it would make a "national interest" driven
foreign policy impossible.
III. U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE ROME TREATY WOULD
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Federal Judicial Power Cannot be Subordinated to an Extra-
Constitutional Institution, Allowing that Institution to Prosecute
American Nationals for Crimes Committed in the United States
United States ratification of the Rome Statute also would be
unconstitutional. Each of the offenses defined in that instru-
ment are otherwise within the judicial power of the United
States22 and, when those offenses are committed on U.S. terri-
21. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, supra note 19, para. 50.
22. Each of the offenses defined in the Rome Treaty: (1) genocide; (2) crimes
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tory, involving only American nationals, that jurisdiction is exclu-
sive. 2' This point has been conceded even by strong ICC propo-
nents, such as former State Department Legal Adviser (under
President Gerald R. Ford) Monroe Leigh. Speaking on behalf of
the American Bar Association, Mr. Leigh explained territoriality
as follows before the House of Representatives Committee on
International Relations:
This principle is firmly established in international law and
no less firmly established in U.S. constitutional law. In 1812
in the famous Schooner Exchange case, Chief Justice Mar-
shall wrote:
(The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is nec-
essarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible to no limita-
tion not imposed by itself) (7 Cranch 116, 135).24
In 1957 when the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was
subjected to a rigorous constitutional reexamination, the Su-
preme Court unanimously came to the same conclusion. It
stated, "[a] sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish
offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it
expressly or impliedly consents to surrender jurisdiction. 25
Although Mr. Leigh cited the territoriality principle as a
means of showing that, under accepted rules of international
and U.S. law, ICC States parties would have authority over U.S.
against humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) aggression, are fully within the judicial power
of the United States. They all constitute violations "against the laws of nations," and the
Constitution grants Congress the authority to "define and punish ... Offenses against
the Law of Nations." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 2 ("The Congress shall
have Power... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies Committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations."). Cf Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (civil suit alleging various violations of
international humanitarian norms may be brought in court of the United States, so
long as defendant is properly served within the court's jurisdiction). Congress has, in
fact, specifically exercised this power with respect to "war crimes" and "genocide." See
18 U.S.C. § 2441; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093. At the same time, the federal judicial power
extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority,"
and that power is vested exclusively "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
23. This is true notwithstanding the increasingly exaggerated claims made for
"universal" jurisdiction. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
24. See Monroe Leigh, Statement on behalf of the American Bar Association
before the Committee on International Relations United States House of Representa-
tives on the subject of The International Criminal Court (July 25, 2000), 92-102.
25. Girard v. Wilson, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
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troops overseas regardless of whether the U.S. ratifies the Rome
Statute, this principle is equally applicable to the constitutional
question of whether that institution could exercise jurisdiction
over Americans for acts in the United States. Under Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the accepted rules of international law,
and the Rome Statute itself, the ICC cannot exercise this juris-
diction unless and until the United States becomes a State party,
affirmatively vesting that power in the court.26 At the same time,
no part of the judicial authority of the United States can be
vested in the ICC. That court is not provided for under the Con-
stitution, and, consequently, could not try Americans for crimes
committed on U.S. soil.
This conclusion is compelled by the Supreme Court's ruling
in Ex parte Milligan.27 Generally recognized as one of the Court's
"landmark" decisions, Milligan involved a civilian's challenge to
his conviction and condemnation in a military tribunal (a non-
Article III court where the Bill of Rights was not applied), at the
close of the Civil War. A resident of Indiana, but a Confederate
sympathizer, Lamdin P. Milligan, was tried and convicted for se-
ditious activities and, particularly, "for violations of the Laws of
War." The Supreme Court granted his habeas corpus petition and
ordered his release. In doing so, it ruled that "[e]very trial in-
volves the exercise of judicial power," and that the tribunal in
question could exercise "no part of the judicial power of the
country." That power, it noted, was vested by the Constitution
"'in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.' ,,28
The rule and reasoning of Ex parte Milligan are equally and
emphatically applicable to the ICC. Like the military tribunal in
Milligan, the ICC would not be a court ordained or established
by Congress, either under Article III, or under that body's lim-
ited ability to created "legislative" courts under Article 1.2' The
26. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 4.
27. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
28. Id. at 121 (quoting U.S. Constitution).
29. Under Article I, § 8, cl. 9, Congress has the power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court," and, under Article I, § 8, cl. 14, "[t]o make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." These grants of authority
have supported the creation of a number of "courts," such as the United States Court of
Federal Claims and the United States Tax Courts, not subject to the requirements of
Article III, as well as the military courts of justice. This authority does not, however,
permit United States participation in the ICC. Under the Supreme Court decision in
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ICC's judges would not be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, as required by the
Constitution's "Appointments Clause." Additionally, the judges
would not serve for life at good behavior, as required by Article
III, § 1. Moreover, the ICC would not preserve the right to trial
by jury, as required both by Article III, § 2, cl. 3, and by the Sixth
Amendment. Indeed, the ICC would not be bound to comply
with the Bill of Rights, especially those guarantees afforded to
criminal defendants."0 For all of these reasons, it could not be
authorized or permitted by the U.S. Government, through ratifi-
cation of the Rome Statute, to conduct criminal prosecutions of
offenses taking place within the territory of the United States.
In response to this point, ICC proponents often cite the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ex parte Quiin.3" Some claim that
Quiin overruled Milligan. The better informed merely assert
that Quiin limited Milligan to its facts. Both are wrong. In Qui-
rin the Court ruled that a group of men, recruited in Nazi Ger-
many as saboteurs, could be tried and condemned by military
commission. Such commissions are not "Article III" courts, and
they are not bound by the Bill of Rights. They are also incapable
of lawfully trying civilians-a rule required by Milligan and fully
accepted by the Court in Quiin. In fact, the Quiin Court care-
fully distinguished Milligan, explaining that the accused in that
case "was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status
of a prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon
unlawful belligerents."32 The defendants in Quiin, however,
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), there are only three
types of Article I courts permissible: (1) territorial courts, whose authority is limited to
U.S. possessions outside of the territory of the states of the Federal Union; (2) military
courts; and (3) courts overseeing "public rights," such as licensing decisions by federal
agencies. Article I courts cannot, and do not, exercise criminal jurisdiction within the
territory of the several states, as the ICC would were the United States a State Party to
the Rome Statute. Moreover, the ICC would not, in any case, be an institution consti-
tuted by Congress under its Article I power.
30. The "due process" guarantees it would provide are significantly different, and
far less protective of the individual than permitted under the U.S. Constitution. See
infra Part III.C.
31. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32. Claims that Quirin limited Milligan to its facts are clearly based on language in
the opinion stating that, when the Milligan Court concluded the law of war "can never
be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and
where the courts are open and their process unobstructed," this had particular refer-
ence to the facts before it. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121. That is, civilians, like
Milligan, cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution in military (or other non-Article
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were not civilians, but "[u] nlawful combatants... subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful."33 Such. individuals, ruled the Supreme
Court, are neither entitled to trial in the Article III courts, nor to
the protections of the Bill of Rights. 4 The ICC, of course, would
have jurisdiction over civilians, lawful combatants, and unlawful
combatants alike.3 5
The only argument that might be advanced to support an
exercise, by non-Article III courts, of criminal jurisdiction over
American civilians for crimes within the judicial power of the
United States, is one of universality. All of the offenses within
the ICC's jurisdiction have been, at one time or another,
claimed to be the subject of "universal jurisdiction." As such, the
argument runs, they are subject to trial and punishment under
international law regardless of where they take place, or the na-
tionality of the perpetrators or victims. Consequently prosecu-
tions and trials of these offenses by the ICC need not be consid-
III courts) when the regular courts are open and unobstructed. This is a rule that
covers upwards of 95% of the population of the United States, including the President,
all civilians in the chain of command of the U.S. armed forces, and all private citizens
who are civilians.
33. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
34. The Supreme Court has never considered exactly what procedural rights un-
lawful combatants must be afforded. Under the traditional laws of war, they could be
killed without trial. See EMMERICH DE VA-IrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 481 (Luke White
ed., 1792).. However, under the Annex to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 30 (1907), spies can no longer be shot out of
hand, and Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, provides that un-
lawful combatants are entitled to certain basic due process guarantees. See Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 75(1) (4). The United States has
not ratified this treaty, but at -least some of its provisions embody norms of customary
international law.
35. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948), also is frequently cited to support the-
proposition that U.S. participation in the ICC regime would not violate the Constitu-
tion. However, it too is inapposite. Hirota involved the trial of Japanese officers and
officials by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("MTFE"). The Su-
preme Court refused to review the case. It reasoned, in a generous eight sentence
opinion, that the MTFE was "not a tribunal of the United States." Rather, that court
was a tribunal established in Japan, by her conquerors: "The United States and other
allied countries conquered and now occupy and control Japan. General Douglas Mac-
Arthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Pow-
ers. The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General Mac-
Arthur as the agent of the Allied.Powers." Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198. Thus, the 'Judicial
authority" exercised by the MTFE was not that of the United States, but of the defeated
Japanese State. In fact, the International Military Tribunal convened in Nuremberg to
try the Nazi leadership based its authority on the very same reasoning. See infra note 41
and accompanying text.
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ered an exercise of the judicial power of the United States, but
of any of the ICC States parties (who would have jurisdiction
themselves under this theory),. or ofthe "international commu-
nity" at large.36 This, however, would require the application of
a universality principle that is inconsistent with, and superior to,
the territorial principle. There is no support in international
law for such a rule.
In fact, despite the inflated claims regularly made on behalf
of "universal jurisdiction," territorial jurisdiction remains the pri-
mary basis of international legal authority, recognized by all
States and supported by centuries of consistent practice.37
"Universality" has a far more checkered pedigree. In theoiy, it
permits any State to proscribe certain conduct damaging to all
States. In practice, the only universal offenses that have a long
history of general acceptance are piracy and the slave trade, both
activities taking place on the high seas, beyond the territorial ju-
risdiction of any single State. Since the Second World War,
claims have also been made that "genocide," "war crimes," and
"crimes against humanity" are subject to the universality princi-
ple. Even assuming that this is the case, 38 recognizing the au-
thority of States to proscribe certain conduct does not resolve
the issue of whether they would, in any particular circumstance,
also have the authority to prosecute and punish the offense. As
Professor Alfred Rubin has explained:
The analogy between war atrocities and "universal offenses"
36. See, e.g., Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 105 (1995) ("The international
court operates under its own authority and applies its own law; the judicial power it
exercises is that of the international community rather than that of any one state.").
Power, however, must have some source. Despite the efforts of international activists,
and the fondest dreams of many in the professoriate, the "international community"
has no authority that is separate and apart from the world's independent nation-States.
If there is "international" authority to vest in the ICC, it must be found in the authority
reposed in the States making up the international system.
37. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 300 (4th
ed. 1990) ("[t]he principle that the courts of the place where the crime is committed
may exercise jurisdiction has received universal recognition, and is but a single applica-
tion of the essential territoriality of the sovereignty, the sum of legal competences,
which a state has.").
38. Even supporters of this theory have admitted that there is little actual State
practice supporting its application to such offenses in specific cases. See Christopher C.
Joyner, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights: Arresting Impunity-The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to
Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 153, 166 (1996).
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such as "piracy" or the slave trade does not relate to jurisdic-
tion to enforce or to adjudicate, but only to the applicability
of national criminal legislation: the reach of so-called 'juris-
diction to prescribe." And, even there, the extension of a na-
tional jurisdiction to make criminal acts of some foreigners
outside the territory of the prescribing state has been much
exaggerated by scholars unfamiliar with the actual cases and
equally unaware of the dismal record of failed attempts to
codify the supposed international criminal law relating to
"piracy" or the international slave trade.39
It is, in fact, difficult to find a single instance in which a
State exercised "universal"jurisdiction over offenses taking place
within the territory of another State, where none of its nationals
were involved. Most recently, the effort by a Spanish judge to
extradite former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet from Brit-
ain, does not present such an example. Although the universal-
ity principle was invoked, the victims of Pinochet's alleged of-
fenses included a number of Spanish nationals. Similarly, al-
though Israel invoked universal jurisdiction as a basis for the
trial and condemnation of Adolph Eichmann, the Israeli Su-
preme Court was careful to note, in its opinion upholding the
Eichmann trial and verdict, that both the "protective" and "pas-
sive personality" principles also supported its jurisdiction over
the case.4" The International Military Tribunal ("IMT"), con-
vened at Nuremberg in 1946, certainly would not support such a
rule. In fact, that court never claimed to exercise universal juris-
diction of any sort, resting its authority instead on the rights of
the defeated German State:
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement
and Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibil-
ity, are set out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive,
and binding upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative
power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally
surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for
the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world.
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part
of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as
39. Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia and the Limits of Law, NAT'L INT., Dec. 22, 1996.
40. See Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 1, 304 (1968).
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will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing
at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contri-
bution to international law.
41
Whatever the developments in the law of "universal jurisdiction"
over the past fifty years, the universality principle has not
reached a level of acceptance that would permit its application
in clear contravention of the predominant territorial principle.42
In any case, the question whether universality could support
ICC jurisdiction over offenses committed in the United States is
academic. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC would have this
power only if the United States were to deposit an instrument of
ratification. Whether this action can be taken is governed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, which prevail over
any inconsistent international law rule.4 3 Vesting this power in
the ICC would directly contravene the Constitution's require-
ments, as articulated in Ex parte Milligan, and neither the Presi-
dent nor the Senate may take such action.4 4
41. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1946) (emphasis added). The United
Nations' ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
also do not present instances of the universality principle in action. As noted above,
both of these bodies were established pursuant to the U.N. Security Council's authority
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to adopt "measures ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. They remain political, rather
than legal, institutions, despite their judicial form.
42. Moreover, although application of the universality principle under the Rome
Statute is an interesting question, it is also entirely academic. Under the treaty itself,
the ICC cannot exercise authority over U.S. territory unless the United States vests that
authority in the court through the deposit of an instrument of ratification.
43. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) ("[w]e do not make the laws of
war but we respect them so far as they do not conflict with the commands of Congress
or the Constitution."). The fact that a treaty is involved does not change this analysis or
conclusion. As the Supreme Court wrote more than a century ago: "The treaty power,
as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments
.... It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitu-
tion forbids . . ." Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
44. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) is not to the contrary. In that case, the
Supreme Court upheld a treaty with Britain regulating migratory birds against a consti-
tutional attack claiming that the treaty infringed the sovereign rights of the states under
the Tenth Amendment. Justice Holmes reasoned that the power to enter such a treaty,
even if not specifically provided for among Congress' enumerated powers in the Consti-
tution, could be inferred from the residual authority of the United States under the
treaty-making power. He acknowledged, however, that there were some things the Fed-
eral Government could not do in a treaty, because such action might violate some other
provision of the Constitution, noting that "[t]he treaty in question does not contravene
any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it
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Finally, the fact that offenses within the ICC's jurisdiction
are unlikely to occur within the territory of the United States
does not change this analysis, or make ratification of the Rome
Statute any less unconstitutional. The treaty's constitutionality
must be assessed based on the nature and extent of the power
that it would vest in the ICC, not on the likelihood of any partic-
ular exercise of that power. However unthinkable, "violations of
the laws and customs of war," "genocide," and "crimes against
humanity" may occur anywhere. Each of the Rome Statute's def-
initions of these offenses are subject to interpretation and appli-
cation by the court itself. The "unthinkable" happens, even in
America.
B. If the United States Were to Join the ICC Treaty Regime, ICC
Prosecutions of Americans for Crimes Allegedly Committed
Overseas Also Would be Unconstitutional
In addition to the constitutional impediments to ratification
of the Rome Statute outlined above, the United States also can-
not become an ICC State Party because this would require it to
cooperate with the court in the apprehension and prosecution
of civilians whose acts may have taken place overseas without the
full and undiluted guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In this re-
gard, if the United States were to become a "State Party" under
the Rome Treaty, it would be more than a neutral bystander with
respect to the ICC's actions. In addition to vesting a portion of
its own judicial power in the court, it would undertake obliga-
tions to "cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes," including-among many other things-
the arrest and extradition of individuals wanted by the ICC, the
"execution of searches and seizures," and the "provision of
records and documents, including official records and docu-
is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment." Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34.
The guarantees provided to criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights are far more
precise, and in mandatory language. This point is made clear in Mr. Justice Black's
plurality decision in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), a case in which the Supreme
Court ruled that an American civilian could not be subject to trial in a military court
overseas, even though an international agreement between Britain and the United
States appeared to allow such a trial. On that occasion, Black wrote that "(a] t the begin-
ning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against its citizens overseas, it
can do so free of the Bill of Rights." Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
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ments."45  Moreover, as explained above, the United States
would be a member of the Assembly of States Parties, the body
responsible for selecting the ICC's judges and prosecutor, over-
seeing the administrative operation of the court, setting its
budget, and adopting the court's rules of procedure and evi-
dence.46 This level of involvement with the court would be suffi-
cient to trigger the requirements of the Bill of Rights-guaran-
tees that the ICC simply does not provide.4"
This analysis and result was suggested by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Balsys.,4 This case involved the investigation of
an individual, Balsys, accused of committing war crimes in Lithu-
ania. Balsys argued that he could not constitutionally be re-
quired to submit to interrogation, by the United States Depart-
ment ofJustice, asserting the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, not-
ing that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to Balsys' case be-
cause he would be prosecuted, if at all, in a non-U.S. court.
However, the Court recognized that the situation might be very
different if his prosecution was undertaken in a non-U.S. court
in concert with the United- States. In this respect, the Court ex-
plained that:
If the United States and its allies had enacted substantially
similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of inter-
national character, and if it could be shown that the United
States was granting immunity from domestic prosecution for
the purpose of obtaining evidence to be delivered to other
nations as prosecutors of a crime common to both countries,
then an argument could be made that the Fifth Amendment
should apply based on fear offoreign prosecution simply be-
cause that prosecution was not fairly characterized as distinctly 'for-
eign." The point would be that the prosecution was as much on be-
half of the United States as of the prosecuting nation . .49
45. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 86, 91, 93.
46. Id. arts. 51, 112.
47. Claims by ICC proponents that the Rome Statute provides guarantees
"equivalent" to those found in the Bill of Rights are incorrect. See infra Part III.C. In
addition, even if the rights provided to the accused in accordance with the Rome Stat-
ute were comparable to those required under the Constitution, it would be irrelevant to
the ICC's legality. The Constitution makes no provision for "equivalent" guarantees.
Where it applies, only the full and undiluted requirements of Article III and the Bill of
Rights suffice.
48. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
49. Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
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This would, of course, be exactly the case with the ICC. If the
United States became an ICC State Party, the prosecutions un-
dertaken by the court-whether involving the actions of Ameri-
cans in the United States or overseas-would be "as much on
behalf of the United States as of' any other State Party. Since
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights would not be available under
the ICC, the United States could not participate in, or facilitate,
any such court.
Critics of this analysis are quick to point out that the lan-
guage quoted above, from Justice Souter's opinion in Balsys, was
dicta; and so it was. However, ICC supporters have yet to pro-
duce authority of even equal weight suggesting that the United
States may, through the device of a treaty or other international
agreement, shed its responsibilities under the Bill of Rights in
these circumstances. The Constitution obviously does not hold
the U.S. Government responsible for the actions of other nation-
States, or of international institutions. The United States, how-
ever, is limited in its authority and actions by the Constitution,
and constitutional imperatives cannot be avoided by laundering
otherwise unconstitutional actions through an international in-
stitution.
The implications of the opposite conclusion, so eagerly em-
braced by ICC supporters, should give pause even to those Amer-
icans intoxicated by the prospects of a truly "international" jus-
tice. If the federal government could slip its constitutional collar
by simply associating one or more other countries in a particular
project, then there is no constitutional invocation, prohibition,
or mandate that cannot be avoided. This is particularly the case
with the trial and punishment of criminal offenses. If the United
States can join the ICC regime, then it also could create any
number of "international" courts, by agreement with one or
more non-U.S. States, for the trial of other offenses within the
judicial power of the United States. The entire federal court sys-
tem could, in principle, be transferred "off-shore," avoiding the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and permitting summary trials
and punishments.
For example, the Bush Administration's decision to estab-
lish, under the authority of Quirin, military commissions to try al
Qaeda operatives and others involved in terrorist attacks against
the United States has been severely criticized because the courts
do not provide the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Their reach,
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however, is highly limited. Under Quinn's teaching, military
commissions may only try unlawful combatants during time of
war. If the United States is free to.join the ICC, it would also be
free to enter an international agreement with other States estab-
lishing a new international court to try, without the protections
of the Bill of Rights, all offenses the agreement defines as "ter-
rorism." That definition could be as expansive as the parties
chose, including any word or deed considered critical of the
Government or in opposition to its policies. The First Amend-
ment, under this interpretation of the Constitution, would be no
bar. ICC supporters should consider whether they really wish
that this was the law.
C. Bill of Rights-Lite
In considering that question, it is important to note that
neither international criminal courts in general, nor the ICC in
particular, provide protections to the accused equivalent to
those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. First, and foremost, the
Rome Statute makes no provision for trial by jury. This, how-
ever, is among the most important rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. It is the only "due process" right that was incorporated
into the Constitution's original six articles (Article III, § 2), and
again restated in the first ten articles of the amendment.50 This
was no drafting error. For the Constitution's Framers, the right
to trial by jury was both a means of determining facts in ajudicial
proceeding and a fundamental and necessary check on the use
and abuse of governmental power. As Justice Joseph Story ex-
plained: "The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is to
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the
part of the people."5' It is "part of that admirable common law,
which had fenced round, and interposed barriers on every side
against the approaches of arbitrary power. "52
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[t]he trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.");
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.").
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Moreover, the Constitution guarantees more than justa jury
trial. It also requires that trials be held in "in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed."5 This requirement
was in direct response to events before the War for Indepen-
dence, when Americans faced the real possibility of transporta-
tion overseas for trial without a jury. In this regard, the British
Government had claimed the right to prosecute Americans in
British courts overseas, and instituted a practice of arraigning
Americans before "vice-admiralty" courts for criminal violations
of the navigation and trade laws. These courts were not English
Common Law courts. Like the ICC, they followed the Civil Law
"inquisitorial," system, where guilt or innocence was determined
by judges alone and rights of confrontation and counsel were
highly restricted.54 In addition, Parliament also had claimed the
right to transport Americans to England on treason charges-a
claim denied by the colonial legislatures.5" These practices were
considered serious abuses by the founding generation, and were
included in the catalog of outrages, justifying, separation from
Britain, set forth in the Declaration of Independence. That doc-
ument accused King and Parliament of:
* "subjecting us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution
and unacknowledged by our laws;"
" "depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by
Jury;" and of
* "transporting us beyond the Seas to be tried for pretended
Offences."56
When the Constitution was adopted, the Framers guarded
against the recurrence of such practices by requiring that trials
be conducted in the state and district where the crime was com-
mitted. As Justice' Story explained,
The object of this clause is to secure the party accused from
being dragged to a trial in some distant state, away from his
friends, and witnesses, and neighborhood; and thus subjected
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. See generally THOMAS C. BARROW, TRADE AND EMPIRE: THE BRITISH CUSTOMS SER-
VICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 1660-1775, at 256 (1967); DON COOK, THE LONG FUSE: How
ENGLAND LOST THE AMERICAN COLONIES 1760-1785, at 59 (1995).
55. See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 4 & n.1 (1998).
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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to the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common
sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or prejudices
against him.57
If the United States were tojoin the ICC Treaty, Americans again
would face transportation beyond the seas forjudgment, without
the benefits of trial by jury, in a court that would not guarantee
the other rights we all take so much for granted-and where the
judges may well "cherish animosities, or prejudices against"
them.
Trial by jury is not, of course, the only right enjoyed by
Americans that would not be guaranteed in the ICC. For exam-
ple, Americans brought before that court would not enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, or to confront and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, in any form recognizable in the United States.
Although the Rome Statute provides that "the accused shall be
entitled to a public hearing," without "undue' delay,". and to "ex-
amine, or have examined, the witnesses against him," the inter-
pretation and application of these protections on the interna-
tional level fall far short of constitutionally mandated practice in
the United States. Under the Sixth Amendment, for instance,
the accused's right to confront "the witnesses against him" in-
cludes the right to know the identity of. hostile witnesses, and to
exclude "hearsay" evidence that does not fall,within a recognized
exception to the general rule. On the international level, how-
ever, this is not the case. In the ICTY, a court widely viewed as
the ICC's model, both anonymous witnesses have been permit-
ted, as has virtually unlimited hearsay evidence.58
Similarly, the ICC would not preserve the right to a speedy
trial. In the United States, a defendant has a right to be brought
to trial within seventy days from the filing date of the indict-
ment.59 There would be no such limit in the ICC. Again, inter-
national practice here falls far short of American requirements.
For example, the Yugoslav Tribunal Prosecutor actually has ar-
gued that up to five years would not be too long to wait in prison
57. STORY, supra note 51, at 658.
58. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JusTICE 7, 67, 108-09 (1997). In the
1996 trial of Dusko Tadic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), hearsay evidence was permitted, and several witnesses were al-
lowed to give evidence on an anonymous basis. Id. at 108-09.
59. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3161(c)(1) (2001).
2002] 863
864 FORDHAMIATERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:840
for a trial.60 More disturbing still, there is case law in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights arguably supporting such a rule.61
In addition, the Rome Statute would permit the ICC prosecutor
to appeal any verdict of acquittal. Such appeals have been for-
bidden in Anglo-American law since the 17th century, and would
violate the protections against "double jeopardy" contained in
the Fifth Amendment. Whatever the protections provided in the
Rome Statute, they are not the "equivalent" of the constitutional
guarantees provided in the United States.
D. The Extradition Cases
Although the ICC would not preserve the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, another argument often advanced in support of
U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute is that the Constitution
does not prevent the extradition of Americans to face trial in
non-U.S. courts that also do not afford those rights. In fact, the
Supreme Court has ruled that American citizens can be extra-
dited for trial overseas in court systems that do not meet mini-
mum U.S. constitutional standards.62 These cases, however, in-
volve instances where Americans have committed crimes abroad,
or where their actions in the United States are intended to
achieve a criminal effect in another country. 6 As the Neely
Court reasoned:
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign
country he cannot complain if required to submit to such
modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different
mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that
country and the United States.64
By contrast, as noted above, the Rome Statute would not merely
require the United States to surrender citizens charged with of-
60. See The Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Prosecution Response to the Defence Motion for
Provisional Release, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT, Jan. 14, 1998, 3.2.5.
61. The Case of W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding four
years of pretrial detention accepted); "Neumeister" Case, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1968) (holding three year pre-trial detention acceptable, and up to seven years not too
long to try a criminal case).
62. See, e.g., Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
63. See Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that an individ-
ual, whose actions took place in the United States, was subject to extradition where acts
were intended to produce criminal effect in another country).
64. Neely, 180 U.S. at 123.
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fenses committed abroad. Were the United States to ratify that
treaty, it would be required to surrender to the ICC American
nationals charged with offenses committed in the United States,
involving only other American citizens. There is no precedent
permitting such a practice.
E. "Complementarity ": The Last Redoubt
Failing all else, ICC proponents often claim that the princi-
ple of "complementarity" would protect Americans from prose-
cution and trial by the ICC, and so also would resolve the consti-
tutional impediments to U.S. accession to the ICC Treaty. This
too is incorrect. Whatever solace "complementarity" may pro-
vide to other States parties, it can give no comfort, either practi-
cally or constitutionally, to the United States.
The principle of "complementarity" is stated in Article 1 of
the Rome Statute, which provides that the ICC's jurisdiction is to
be "complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. ' 65 Ac-
cordingly, under Article 17 of the Statute, the ICC must deter-
mine that a particular case is "inadmissible" where (1) "[t]he
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has ju-
risdiction over it;" or (2) "[t]he case has been investigated by a
State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the person concerned. '6 6 However, these limita-
tions do not apply where a State "is unwilling or unable genu-
inely to carry out the investigation or prosecution," or where a
decision not to prosecute "resulted from the unwillingness or in-
ability of the State genuinely to prosecute."6 7 In "order to deter-
mine unwillingness in a particular case," the ICC will consider
whether the national proceedings "were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially and [whether] they
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circum-
stances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person con-
cerned to justice. '68 This is a test the United States can never
meet.
Under the Constitution, decisions on whether to prosecute
both military and civilian personnel are a matter solely for the
65. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
66. Id. art. 17(1).
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 17(2).
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Executive Branch, and ultimately for the President.69 At the
same time, the military and civilian individuals most likely to be
accused of offenses within the ICC's authority also are Executive
Branch personnel, directly accountable to the President as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In
such cases, the President is, in fact, always himself a potential
defendant under a "command responsibility" theory. Therefore,
it could be argued that the United States' decision not to pursue
a case involving such an individual can never be "independent"
or "impartial." Upon this pretext, the ICC would be in a posi-
tion to examine each and every use of American military power
to determine whether, in its view, offenses within its authority
have been committed. Thus, if the United States were to join
the ICC Treaty regime, the principle of "complementarity"
would be no bar to the arraignment of Americans before the
ICC.
IV. WHOSE JUSTICE?
In addition to the aspects of the ICC that militate against
U.S. participation, including the court's lack of American-style
democratic accountability, and the constitutional impediments
to U.S. ratification, there are fundamental problems with the
ICC project that should concern the entire "international com-
munity." Although there is support, both in customary interna-
tional and treaty law, for the criminal punishment of the four
offenses subject to the ICC'sjurisdiction, there is.little practice
or precedent that supports. the prosecution of individuals before
international institutions. Both the International Military Tribu-
nal ("IMT") and Military Tribunal for the Far East ("MTFE")
were created by the victorious allies after World War II based on
their authority as the conquerors of Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan, rather than as representations of the international com-
munity."v Similarly, the ad hoc tribunals created during the
1990s by the U.N. Security Council were not based on any judi-
cial power inherent in the "international community," but as
measures "to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
69. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("There is no real dispute that
the [investigative and prosecutorial] functions performed by the independent counsel
are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have
been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.").
70. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1946).
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ity," under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.7" That body pos-
sesses no legal or judicial authority with which to vest a court
(the International Court of justice being the 'judicial organ" of
the United Nations). Consequently, and despite elaborate judi-
cial trappings, including the ancien regime scarlet and ermine
worn by the judges (mere lawyers are clothed in the modest
black of the Third Estate), these institutions exercise political-
rather than judicial-authority.7 2 Appropriately, those institu-
tions were strictly limited to the application of "existing interna-
tional humanitarian law."7 Whether States, acting as States,
have the authority to create independentjudicial bodies with the
power to prosecute and punish individuals remains an open
question, with little international custom to support such action.
This lack of international precedent is, however, hardly sur-
prising. Notions of justice and fairness, which must support any
judicial system, vary dramatically from society to society, and
there is no internationally recognized standard. Even the
world's most closely related legal systems, the Common Law and
the Civil Law, take dramatically different approaches to "due
process," and particularly the conduct of criminal trials. In
Common Law countries, trials are conducted in accordance with
the "accusatorial" or "adversarial" system. The judge acts as a
neutral arbiter, ruling on points of law, but taking no active part
in the investigation of the matter, or in the presentation of the
case for or against the accused. That case unfolds during a pub-
lic trial, in which the prosecution acts as a zealous advocate
against the accused, and defense counsel advocates equally
strongly on the accused behalf. (As a result, the Common Law
lawyer tends to behave far more aggressively in both the presen-
tation of the case, and cross-examination of witnesses, than the
Civilian.) For any serious offense, like those covered under the
Rome Statute, the accused is entitled to trial by a jury, which
ultimately determines whether he is convicted or acquitted.
71. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 22-30, at 7-8 [hereinafter Secretary General's
Report].
72. Although the ICTY itself has concluded that the Security Council had this au-
thority in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 11 18-22 (Oct. 2, 1995), the Tribunal's legality
has not been tested in an independent forum.
73. Secretary General's Report, supra note 71, at 29, at 8.
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Among other things, the accused has the right to confront, and
cross-examine, all of the witnesses (and other evidence) against
him in open court, and the "rules of evidence" are crafted to
vindicate this right. If the jury's verdict results in an acquittal, it
cannot be challenged or appealed. Juries can, and do, exercise
the ultimate power of the sovereign, by permitting individuals
who may be guilty in fact, to go free.
By contrast, the Civil Law criminal trial is conducted
through an "inquisitorial" process. The judiciary is a full partici-
pant in the investigation of the case against the accused. Before
the trial begins, an "examining" or "investigative" judge reviews
the material compiled by the prosecutor, and conducts his own
additional inquiries. This "examining" phase takes place in se-
cret, and is mostly conducted in writing. The accused is entitled
to counsel, who may both advise the accused during this stage,
and bring matters to the judge's attention on the accused's be-
half. The accused may be questioned by the judge, and any re-
fusal to answer may be taken into account in determining his
guilt or innocence-a practice clearly forbidden in the United
States by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
By the time the "trial" phase begins, the "record" is already com-
pleted, and includes all of the evidence considered relevant by
the investigating judge. During the trial the prosecution and de-
fense counsel argue their interpretation of the record to the trial
judge (a different individual than the investigating judge) and,
often, to "lay assessors." Verdicts of acquittal are often subject to
appeal, and this feature has been carried over into the Rome
Statute. 4
Although each of these systems works well enough in its
own context, and on its own terms, they do not mix well to-
gether. For example, in the United States' legal system "hearsay"
evidence-statements, related in court, but made by an individ-
ual who is not present, and who cannot be cross-examined-is
generally excluded from criminal trials. Hearsay is excluded, in
74. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 124-32 (2d ed.
1969). Obviously, this is a highly generalized description of Civil Law procedure.
These procedures differ, sometimes substantially, from country to country. (Germany,
for instance, has evidently eliminated the "examining phase"). Id. at 129. In France,
only certain acquittals are subject to appeal. See CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN,
THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 218-19 (1996).
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part, because it may be unreliable. However, hearsay is often
entirely accurate and highly probative. It is nevertheless ex-
cluded because the accused will have no opportunity to confront
and test, through vigorous cross-examination, the veracity of the
individual actually making the statement. In the ICTY, hearsay
evidence is admitted virtually without limitation, on the theory
that the Tribunal's professional judges will, unlike a lay jury, be
able to adequately assess and discount the evidence. Neither the
critical importance of vindicating the accused's right to confront
the witnesses against him, nor the basic human fallibility even of
professional judges is acknowledged. Other aspects of this at-
tempt to mix Civil Law and Common Law assumptions and prac-
tices, such as the role of precedent and stare decisis, continue to
bedevil ICTY proceedings.
The problem here is not merely one of "growing pains."
The Civil Law and Common Law systems, in fact, represent the
different approaches to law, justice, and government that have
divided Anglo-American from Continental societies since the
Middle Ages, and especially in the United States since Indepen-
dence. The fundamental premise underlying the Civil Law sys-
tem is that justice is most likely to be achieve through the good
offices of highly professional, well intentioned individuals
guided by the application of reason. The fundamental premise
underlying the Common Law system is that justice is most likely
to be done if each party is vigorously represented, and that the
system itself must be structured to operate regardless of the
good will or intentions of the individuals involved.
This very basic difference in approach explains many of the
disagreements between the United States and other States at the
1998 Rome Conference, and is most obvious in the debate over
the power and independence of the ICC prosecutor. The
United States sought institutional checks on the prosecutor's
power, which it was unable to achieve. Representatives of many
European States, however, were far more interested in creating a
powerful prosecutor, taking for granted that the job would be
filled by a responsible, professional individual, who could be
trusted not to abuse his or her authority.
In any case, the tension between these two systems is likely
to cause individual injustices, and it will certainly be perceived as
such. Ironically, in the ICTY's case, the unfairness is not that
Civil Law aspects have been incorporated into the system, but
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that so many Common Law elements are involved. All of the
defendants before the ICTY have come from Civil Law jurisdic-
tions. This, however, will not be the case with the ICC, particu-
larly if the United States were to become a State Party to the
Rome Statute. The fundamental difference between criminal
procedure in the United States, and that adopted in the Rome
Statute, including such elements as in camera trial proceedings,
the limited nature of the right of confrontation, the lack of a
jury, and the prosecutor's right to appeal acquittals, suggest that
no American could receive a fair trial, as that term is understood
and accepted in the United States, before the ICC. The same
can be said for many of the other countries, whether Civil Law or
Common Law, that already have signed and ratified the treaty.
"IT IS NOT MY APPREHENSION, NOR YOURS NEITHER,
THAT OUGHT TO DECIDE IT"
ICC proponents, and particularly the drafters of the Rome
Statute, would doubtless respond that agreement has, in fact,
been reached on a proper standard of justice and procedural
fairness. The Rome Statute was, after all, signed by an over-
whelming number of States. But that, of course, is the point. It
was signed by States, yet it will have power over individuals.
Those individuals must recognize and accept its authority if the
court is to be legitimate. Like all courts of law, the ICC must be
prepared to answer the question first put by Britain's King
Charles I, at the opening of his trial in January 1649: "I would
know by what power I am called hither... I would know by what
authority-I mean lawful-there are many unlawful authorities
in the world-thieves and robbers by the highways . . . ."" The
parliamentarians arraigning the King before their "High Court
of Justice," had no answer. The court's president, John Brad-
shaw, did no more than assert that "[w]e are satisfied with our
authority .... "- 6 To which the King responded, " [b] ut that you
have said satisfies no reasonable man."77 "That's in your appre-
hension," said Bradshaw, "[w] e think it reasonable that are your
judges."7 " The king then had the last word, "[t]is not my appre-
75. DAVID LAGOMARSINO & CHARLES T. WOOD, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES 1: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 64 (1989).
76. Id. at 66.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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hension-nor yours either-that ought to decide it."7 9 Hope-
lessly bested, Bradshaw's only response was to order Charles re-
moved from the court.
This scene was replayed recently, at the ICTY, when
Slobodan Milosevic was brought to the bar. Like King Charles,
he challenged the court's legitimacy and, like John Bradshaw
350 years before, the presiding judge had no better answer than
to silence the prisoner-by turning off his microphone in this
instance. A permanent ICC will have to do better.
Legitimacy must be based on acceptance, and this cannot
be decreed by States, even by those with elected governments.
The ICTY, again, is a case in point. All of the States subject to
that court's jurisdiction, including Croatia, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have accepted the
authority of the Security Council to create the ICTY, and the
court's authority to investigate and prosecute their citizens. Yet,
the citizens of those States remain deeply divided over the
ICTY's legality and the appropriateness of its operations. Many
Serbs, in both Yugoslavia and Bosnia, remain convinced that the
court has unfairly singled out Serb leaders, including Milosevic;
for prosecution when other groups were equally as guilty, if not
more so. Similarly, it is an article of faith in many parts of Croa-
tia that the ICTY has unfairly targeted Croats for prosecution,
thus punishing the victims rather than the aggressors. There is
little doubt that, as the prosecutor begins to, consider and bring
indictments against Bosnian Muslim leaders, similar sentiments
will be expressed in that community.
Even if the public expression of such views can be sup-
pressed, the beliefs they represent cannot be. The judgments of
a court that is not genuinely accepted as legitimate by the people
over whom it exercises authority will never be considered any-
thing but arbitrary acts of power. The proponents of the ICC in
general, and the drafters of the Rome Statute in particular, have
yet to adequately address this issue of fundamental legitimacy.
They have failed to articulate, in a satisfactory way, the legitimate
source of power whereby an institution, based upon an interna-
tional agreement, drafted by the representatives of States, may
prosecute and punish individual human beings. To date, their
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